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Abstract—We consider oblivious transfer between Alice and
Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve when there is
a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition
to the secrecy constraints of Alice and Bob, Eve should not
learn the private data of Alice and Bob. When the broadcast
channel consists of two independent binary erasure channels, we
derive the oblivious transfer capacity for both 2-privacy (where
the eavesdropper may collude with either party) and 1-privacy
(where there are no collusions).
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of secure multiparty computation (MPC) is for
mutually distrusting parties to collaborate in computing func-
tions of their data, but without revealing anything more about
their data to others than what they can infer from the function
outputs and data. Useful applications of secure MPC include
voting, auctions and data-mining amongst several others, see
e.g., [3, Chap. 1]. It is well known that information theoret-
ically (unconditionally) secure computation is not possible,
in general (i.e. for arbitrary functions), between two parties
with noiseless communication and only common and private
randomness. A combinatorial charaterization of functions that
can be securely computed by two parties is given in [7].
Two-party secure computation, in general, requires additional
stochastic resources. Specifically, a noisy channel between the
parties provides a means to achieve secure computation [4].
Oblivious Transfer (OT) has been proposed as a basic
primitive (which can be derived from noisy channels) on which
secure computation can be founded [5], [6]. One-out-of-two
(1-of-2) string OT is a secure 2-party primitive computation,
where one party, Alice, has two strings of equal lengths out
of which, the other party, Bob, obtains exactly one string
of his choice without Alice finding out the identity of the
string selected by Bob. The (string) OT capacity of a discrete
memoryless channel is the largest string-length-per-channel-
use that can be supported. OT capacity of discrete memoryless
channels has been studied in [1], [8], [9]. In [8], a lower
bound on the string OT capacity of noisy channels and source
distributions was obtained for honest-but-curious participants
(i.e., the parties do not deviate from the prescribed protocol,
but attempt to derive information about the other party’s input
that they are not allowed to know from everything they have
access to at the end of the protocol). [1] characterizes the string
OT capacity for generalized erasure channels, when the two
parties are honest-but-curious. [9] shows that this honest-but-
curious string OT capacity of generalized erasure channels can,
in fact, be achieved even when the two parties are malicious.
A natural consideration when using noisy channels is the
presence of third parties who may derive useful information
about the computation. For example, consider the noisy re-
source as a wireless channel. In this case, an eavesdropper who
receives partial information about the transmissions can use it
to deduce the output or data of the parties. Motivated by this,
we study the OT capacity of an erasure channel in the presence
of an eavesdropper (Figure 2). To the best of our knowledge,
this problem has not been studied before. We limit our study
to the case of honest-but-curious parties Alice and Bob and a
passive eavesdropper Eve. We consider secrecy regimes where
Eve may collude with Alice or Bob (2-privacy) and where
there is no such collusion (1-privacy). These requirements are
made more precise in the next section. We derive the 1-of-2
string OT capacity, for both 1-privacy and 2-privacy, in the
setup of Figure 2 when Bob and Eve receive independently
erased versions of Alice’s transmissions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives
the precise problem definition and states the capacity results
that have been proved. Section III gives the achievability part
of the proof of our results, by describing protocols achieving
any 2-private and 1-private rate below their respective capaci-
ties, for the setp of Figure 2. The converse part for our results
are proved in Section IV. Most of the rate upper bounds we
have hold for the general case of Figure 1, except for one
regime in 1-privacy case where the upper bound is specific to
the setup of Figure 2.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STATEMENT OF RESULTS
In the setup of Figure 1, Alice has two independent,
uniformly distributed m-length bit strings K0,K1 and Bob has
a uniformly distributed choice bit C independent of K0,K1.
Alice is connected to Bob and Eve by a discrete memory-
less broadcast channel defined by the conditional distribution
pY Z|X . Further, Alice and Bob can communicate over an
error-free public channel of unlimited capacity, with Eve able
to receive every message sent on this pulic channel. Alice, Bob
and Eve are honest-but-curious participants in the protocols
that run in this setup.
Definition 1: An (m,n, k) protocol uses the broadcast
channel at some instances i1, i2, .., in ∈ {1, . . . , k} and the
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Fig. 1. Setup for obtaining Oblivious Transfer.
public channel at instances {1, . . . , k}\{i1, i2, .., in} and takes
the following steps :
1) At the begining of the protocol, Alice and Bob generate
private random variables M,N respectively, which are
independent of each other and all other system variables
available.
2) i /∈ {i1, i2, .., in}: Fi = Fi(K0,K1,M, F i−1) is the
public message from Alice, if Alice is the one initiating
a public message at time i.
3) i < i1: Fi = Fi(C,N, F i−1) is the public message from
Bob, if Bob is the one initiating a public message at time
i.
4) i = ij : Xj = Xj(K0,K1,M, F i−1), Fi = ∅.
5) ij < i < ij+1: Fi = Fi(C,N, F i−1, Y j) is the public
message from Bob, if Bob is the one initiating a public
message at time i.
The protocol computes Kˆc = Kˆ(C,N, F k, Y n) as Bob’s
string at the end.
We define the views of Alice, Bob and Eve at the end of
the protocol to be, respectively,
Uk = (K0,K1,M, F
k), Vk = (C,N, F
k, Y n), Wk = (F
k, Zn).
Definition 2: A non-negative number R2P is said to be an
achievable 2-private rate if there exists a sequence of (m,n, k)
protocols, with mn −→ R2P as n −→∞, such that
P [KˆC 6= KC ] −→ 0, (1)
I(KC ;Vk,Wk) −→ 0, (2)
I(C;Uk,Wk) −→ 0, (3)
I(K0,K1, C;Wk) −→ 0, (4)
where C = C ⊕ 1.
Definition 3: The 2-private capacity, C2P is defined as the
supremum of all achievable 2-private rates.
Definition 4: A non-negative number R1P is said to be an
achievable 1-private rate if there exists a sequence of (m,n, k)
protocols, with mn −→ R1P as n −→∞, such that
P [KˆC 6= KC ] −→ 0, (5)
I(KC ;Vk) −→ 0, (6)
I(C;Uk) −→ 0, (7)
I(K0,K1, C;Wk) −→ 0, (8)
where C = C ⊕ 1.
Definition 5: The 1-private capacity, C1P is defined as the
supremum of all achievable 1-private rates.
Our main result is the characterization of C2P and C1P
for the setup of Figure 2. In this specific version of the
setup of Figure 1, the broadcast channel is made up of two
independent binary erasure channels (BECs). A BEC with
erasure probability ǫ1 (BEC(ǫ1)) connects Alice to Bob and a
BEC(ǫ2) connects Alice to Eve. BEC(ǫ1) acts independently
of BEC(ǫ2) and no assumption is made on the relative values
of ǫ1 and ǫ2.
Alice BEC(ǫ1) Bob
BEC(ǫ2) Eve
✲ ✲
❄ ❄
✲ ✲
❄
K0,K1 C
KˆC
X Y
Z
public channel
Fig. 2. Setup with the broadcast channel made up of two independent BECs.
We prove the following theorems for the setup of Figure 2.
Theorem 1:
C2P = ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}.
Theorem 2:
C1P =


ǫ1, ǫ1 <
ǫ2
2
ǫ2
2 ,
ǫ2
2 ≤ ǫ1 <
1
2
ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1 ≥
1
2
III. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY
We begin by briefly reviewing the achievable protocol for
a BEC(ǫ1) given in [1]. We note that the setup of Figure 2,
for ǫ2 = 1, reduces to the setup in [1]. Suppose Bob wishes
to obtain one of the strings of length m from Alice. Alice
transmits an i.i.d. uniform sequence of bits Xn over the
broadcast channel. Bob receives an erased version Y n, of Xn.
Bob will choose two sets of m distinct indices (bit locations)
each, a set B (bad set) from the erased indices and a set
G (good set) from the unerased indices. Bob chooses these
sets uniformly at random from among the possible choices. In
this sketch we ignore the possibility that sufficient number of
erased and unerased locations are not present; the probability
of such an event will be made small enough by an appropriate
choice of m and n in the sequel. For C = 0, Bob assigns
(L0, L1) = (G,B); otherwise (L0, L1) = (B,G). Bob sends
(L0, L1) to Alice. Alice will form OT keys, T0 = Xn|L0
and T1 = Xn|L1 , where Xn|L0 denotes the sequence Xn
restricted to the locations in L0. Alice sends K0 ⊕ T0 and
K1 ⊕ T1 to Bob over the public channel. Since Bob knows
TC , he can obtain KC . It is easy to verify that Alice obtains
no information about C and Bob obtains no information about
the KC .
In the setup of Figure 2, privacy against Eve is additionally
required. Let us consider the case of 2-privacy first. In the
above scheme, Eve will learn approximately a fraction 1− ǫ2
of both the OT keys T0 and T1. Hence, Alice must additionally
protect both the strings before sending them over the public
channel. This will be accomplished by setting up additional
secret keys (independent of T0, T1) which are secret from Eve
as follows: Alice and Bob will create (as explained later) two
independent secret keys S0,S1 (each of length approximately
m(1 − ǫ2)), neither of which is known to Eve and only one
of which, namely SC , is known to Bob. Notice that Alice will
remain unaware of the identity of the secret key known to
Bob. Alice uses these secret keys to further encrypt the strings
before sending them over the public channel. Specifically, S0
is used to further encrypt K0⊕T0 and S1 for K1⊕T1. This is
done by Alice expanding S0, S1 (each of length approximately
m(1−ǫ2)) to S˜0, S˜1 respectively (each of length m bits), using
a binary code (obtained using random coding argument) of rate
about (1− ǫ2). Alice sends K0 ⊕ T0 ⊕ S˜0 and K1 ⊕ T1 ⊕ S˜1
to Bob over the public channel.
To generate S0, S1, Alice and Bob use the secret key
agreement scheme of [10], which shows that Alice and Bob
can agree upon a secret key which is almost perfectly secret
from Eve (i.e. I(Si;Wk) −→ 0 as n −→ ∞, i = 1, 2), at rate
ǫ2, if Bob received unerased transmissions from Alice. So, to
generate S0, S1, Bob will uniformly at random choose sets
of indices GS (good secret key set) and BS (bad secret key
set), of length approximately m(1−ǫ2)ǫ2 each, from, respectively,
unerased and erased indices which were unused for OT key
generation. As before, GS , BS are sent to Alice in an order
determined by C. Alice uses Xn|GS , Xn|BS to generate the
secret keys.
For 1-privacy, Bob may choose BS randomly from the
erased and unerased indices it has leftover after creating G, B
and GS . The rest of the protocol remains the same as that for
2-privacy. Clearly, Bob may now know some or all of the bad
secret key. Since this secret key is meant to provide security
against Eve with whom Bob does not collude now, the secrecy
condition is unaffected.
A. Protocol for a achieving any 2-private rate r < C2P
We now present a protocol which achieves any 2-private rate
less than C2P , for the setup of Figure 2. For any δ ∈ (0, 1),
we define
ǫ˜2 := ǫ2(1− δ).
In a protocol where Alice transmits n bits over the BEC, let
E,E,E′ be, respectively, the set of indices where Bob sees
erasures, Bob sees non-erasures, and Eve sees erasures.
E := {i ∈ {i1, . . . , in} : Yi = erasure},
E := {i ∈ {i1, . . . , in} : Yi 6= erasure},
E′ := {i ∈ {i1, . . . , in} : Zi = erasure}.
Let U(A) denotes a uniformly random choice from the set A.
The following lemma says that, with high probability, Eve
will see at least ǫ˜2 fraction of its received sequence erased.
Lemma 1:
P
[
|E′|
n
≥ ǫ˜2
]
−→ 1 exponentially in n.
Proof: The claim follows from Chernoff bound.
The following lemma says that for any rate r < C2P and
a suitably low δ (to define ǫ˜2), Bob will have enough erased
and unerased Yi’s with which to run the protocol and achieve
rate r.
Lemma 2: Suppose r < C2P and δ < (1 − rC2P ). Then
P
[
|E| ≥
nr
ǫ˜2
]
−→ 1 exponentially in n,
P
[
|E| ≥
nr
ǫ˜2
]
−→ 1 exponentially in n.
Proof: The claims follow from Chernoff bound.
Protocol 1: (Protocol for achieving any 2-private rate r <
C2P , for the setup in Figure 2)
Protocol parameters (known to all parties): rate r, δ (suit-
ably low, as per Lemma 2), ǫ˜2, a binary (nr, nr(1− ǫ˜2))-code
Λnr chosen via a random coding argument
Alice Transmits an i.i.d. sequence Xn, where ∀i, Xi ∼
U({0, 1}), over the BEC.
Bob Receives the Y n from BEC(ǫ1). Let r < C2P . Bob
now creates the following sets:
G ∼ U
({
A ⊂ E : |A| = nr
})
,
GS ∼ U
({
A ⊂ E\G : |A| =
nr(1 − ǫ˜2)
ǫ˜2
})
,
B ∼ U ({A ⊂ E : |A| = nr}) ,
BS ∼ U ({A ⊂ E\B : |A| = |GS |}) .
Bob has sufficiently many erased and unerased Yi’s
(with high probability) to create these sets, as a con-
sequence of Lemma 2. Then, depending on the value
of C, Bob further creates the sets L00, L01, L10, L11
as follows.
C = 0 : L00 = G, L01 = GS
L10 = B, L11 = BS
C = 1 : L00 = B, L01 = BS
L10 = G, L11 = GS
Bob sends L00, L01, L10, L11 to Alice over the public
channel.
Alice computes the following keys
T0 = X
n|L00 ,
T1 = X
n|L10 .
Alice generates secret key S0 from Xn|L01 , assum-
ing Bob knows Xn|L01 . Alice also generates secret
key S1 from Xn|L11 , assuming Bob knows Xn|L11 .
S0, S1 are nr(1 − ǫ˜2) bits each.
Alice expands the secret keys S0,S1, to get S˜0, S˜1
of nr bits each
S˜0 = Λnr(S0),
S˜1 = Λnr(S1).
Alice finally sends the following two strings to Bob
over the public channel:
K0 ⊕ T0 ⊕ S˜0,
K1 ⊕ T1 ⊕ S˜1.
Bob has the pair (TC , S˜C), thus it can get KC .
Lemma 3: Any r < C2P is an achievable 2-private rate..
Proof:
A sequence of instances {Pn}n∈N of Protocol 1 will be
used. Let J := 1{|E|≥nr/ǫ˜2}∩{|E|≥nr/ǫ˜2} be the random
variable to indicate the event that Bob has seen enough
erasures and non-erasures. By Lemma 2, Pr[J = 1] −→ 1
exponentially fast.
For ease of notation, we denote:
G = (G,B,GS , BS)
L = (L00, L01, L10, L11)
K˜C = KC ⊕ TC ⊕ S˜C
K˜C = KC ⊕ TC ⊕ S˜C
We note that for our achievable scheme,
Uk = (K0,K1, X
n, L, K˜0, K˜1)
Vk = (C, Y
n, G, K˜0, K˜1)
Wk = (Z
n, L, K˜0, K˜1)
1) To show that (1) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, we note that
P [KˆC 6= KC ] = P [J = 0]P [KˆC 6= KC |J = 0]
+ P [J = 1]P [KˆC 6= KC |J = 1]
Since Pr[J = 0]→ 0 exponentially fast, it is sufficient
to show that P [KˆC 6= KC |J = 1] −→ 0 as n −→∞.
Now, when Bob does have sufficient erasures and non-
erasures, Bob knows TC since TC = Xn|G. Similarly,
Bob knows S˜C since S˜C is a function of SC which, in
turn, is a function of Xn|GS . Thus, when Bob receives
K˜C from Alice, Bob learns KC with zero error. Hence,
P [KˆC 6= KC |J = 1] = 0.
2) To show that (2) is satisfies for {Pn}n∈N, we note that
I(KC ;Vk,Wk) ≤ I(KC ;Vk,Wk, J)
=
∑
j=0,1
Pr[J = j] I(KC ;Vk,Wk|J = j)
+ I(KC ; J).
Since Pr[J = 0] → 0 exponentially fast and
I(KC ; J) = 0, it is sufficient to show that
I(KC ;Vk,Wk|J = 1) −→ 0 as n −→∞. Now,
I(KC ;Vk,Wk|J = 1)
= I(KC ;C, Y
n, Zn, G, L, K˜0, K˜1|J = 1)
= I(KC ;C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , K˜C |J = 1)
= I(KC ; K˜C |C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , J = 1)
[since KC is indep. of (C, Y n, Zn, G, K˜C , J)]
= H(K˜C |C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , J = 1)
−H(K˜C |KC , C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , J = 1)
= nr −H(K˜C |KC , C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , J = 1)
[since KC is indep. of (C, Y n, Zn, G, K˜C , J) and
is uniform over its alphabet ]
= nr −H(TC ⊕ S˜C |KC , C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , J = 1)
= nr −H(TC ⊕ S˜C |C, Y
n, Zn, G, K˜C , J = 1)
[since KC is indep. of (TC , S˜C , C, Y n, Zn, G, K˜C , J) ]
= nr −H(TC ⊕ S˜C |C,Z
n, G, J = 1)
[as TC , S˜C − C,Zn, G− TC , S˜C ,KC , Y n is a
Markov chain conditioned on J = 1]
= nr −H(TC ⊕ S˜C |C,Z
n, G, I, J = 1)
[I := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nr} : TC,i seen unerased in Zn},
I is a function of (Zn, B)]
= nr −H(S˜C,I |C,Z
n, G, I, J = 1)
−H(TC,I ⊕ S˜C,I |C,Z
n, G, I, S˜C,I , J = 1)
[I = {1, 2, . . . , nr}\I]
= nr −H(S˜C,I |C,Z
n, G, I, J = 1)− nrǫ2
[since TC,I − I, B − C,Zn, G\B, S˜C,I is a Markov chain
conditioned on J = 1, and TC,I is uniform over its
alphabet]
= nr(1 − ǫ2)−H(S˜C,I |C, I, J = 1)
+I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
= nr(1 − ǫ2)−H(S˜C,I |I, J = 1)
+I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
[since Xn|BS − I − C is a Markov chain conditioned on
J = 1 and S˜C is a function of X
n|BS ]
≤ nr(1 − ǫ2)−
∑
|i|<nr(1−ǫ˜2−
ǫ2δ
2 )
pI(i)H(S˜C,I |I = i, J = 1)
+I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
≤ nr(1 − ǫ2)−
∑
|i|<nr(1−ǫ˜2−
ǫ2δ
2 )
pI(i) · (|i| − 2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 )
+I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
[using Lemma 10, since ǫ2δ
4
< 1− ǫ˜2 −
|i|
nr
]
= nr(1 − ǫ2) +
∑
|i|<nr(1−ǫ˜2−
ǫ2δ
2 )
pI(i)2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 − E(|I|)
+
∑
|i|≥nr(1−ǫ˜2−
ǫ2δ
2 )
pI(i)|i|+ I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
≤ nr(1 − ǫ2) + pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 − nr(1 − ǫ2)
+
∑
|i|≥nr(1−ǫ˜2−
ǫ2δ
2 )
pI(i) · nr + I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
[pn = Pr(|I| ≥ nr(1 − ǫ˜2 −
ǫ2δ
2
)), pn = 1− pn,
pn −→ 0 exp. as n −→∞ by Lemma 1]
= pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C,I ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
≤ pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C ;Z
n, G|C, I, J = 1)
= pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C ;Z
n, G, I|C, J = 1)
[since I is indep. of (S˜C , C), conditioned on J = 1]
= pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C ;Z
n, G|C, J = 1)
[since I is a function of (Zn, B)]
≤ pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C ;Z
n, G, C|J = 1)
= pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C ;Z
n, BS |J = 1)
[since S˜C − Zn, BS − C,G,B,GS is a Markov chain,
conditioned on J = 1]
≤ pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(S˜C , SC ;Z
n, BS |J = 1)
= pn2
−nr
ǫ2δ
4 + pn · nr + I(SC ;Z
n, BS |J = 1)
[because S˜C is a function of SC ]
The R.H.S. goes to zero, as n −→ ∞, since pn −→
0 exponentially fast with n and since the information
which Eve receives about SC can be made arbitrarily
small for sufficiently large n( [10]).
3) To show that eqn. (3) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, we note
that
I(C;Uk,Wk) = I(C;Uk)
[since C − Uk −Wk is a Markov chain]
≤ I(C;Uk, J)
=
∑
j=0,1
Pr[J = j] I(C;Uk|J = j)
+ I(C; J).
Since Pr[J = 0] → 0 exponentially fast, I(C;Uk|J =
0) ≤ 1 and I(C; J) = 0, it is sufficient to show that
I(C;Uk|J = 1) −→ 0 as n −→∞
Now,
I(C ; Uk|J = 1)
= I(C;K0,K1, X
n, L, K˜0, K˜1|J = 1)
= I(C;L, K˜0, K˜1|K0,K1, X
n, J = 1)
[since C is indep. of (K0,K1, Xn, J)]
= I(C;L|K0,K1, X
n, J = 1)
[since T0, T1, S˜0, S˜1 are functions of (Xn, L)]
= I(C;L|Xn, J = 1)
[since (K0,K1) is indep. of (C,Xn, L, J)]
= H(L|Xn, J = 1)−H(L|Xn, C, J = 1)
= H(L|J = 1)−H(G|C, J = 1)
[since Xn is indep. of (L, J, C)]
= H(L|J = 1)−H(G|J = 1)
[since C is indep. of (G, J)]
= 0
4) To show that eqn. (4) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, we will
use the proofs already seen for Part (2) and Part (3), as
follows:
I(K0,K1, C;Wk)
= I(K0,K1;Wk|C) + I(C;Wk)
= I(KC ,KC ;Z
n, L, K˜C , K˜C |C) + I(C;Wk)
= I(KC ,KC ; K˜C , K˜C |C,Z
n, L) + I(C;Wk)
[since (KC ,KC) is indep. of (Zn, L, C)]
= I(KC ; K˜C , K˜C |C,Z
n, L)
+I(KC ; K˜C , K˜C |C,Z
n, L,KC) + I(C;Wk)
= I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L) + I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L, K˜C)
+I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L,KC)
+I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L,KC , K˜C) + I(C;Wk)
= I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L) + I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L,KC)
+I(KC ;TC ⊕ S˜C |C,Z
n, L,KC , K˜C) + I(C;Wk)
[since KC is indep. of (C,Zn, L, K˜C ,KC)]
= I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L) + I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L,KC)
+I(C;Wk)
[since TC , S˜C − C,Zn, L−KC ,KC , TC , S˜C
is a Markov chain]
= I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L) + I(KC ; K˜C |C,Z
n, L)
+I(C;Wk)
[since KC is indep. of (C,Zn, L,KC , K˜C)]
The first two terms above go to zero following the exact
same arguments as in the proof of Part (2). The last term
above goes to zero as a consequence of the proof of Part
(3).
B. Protocol for achieving any 1-private rate r < C1P
The difference in this protocol, compared to Protocol 1, is
in the way the set BS is chosen.
• ǫ1 <
ǫ2
2 : Bob chooses BS randomly out of leftover
unerased indices and, thus, fully knows the corresponding
secret key.
•
ǫ2
2 ≤ ǫ1 <
1
2 : Bob chooses BS randomly out of all
indices left after creating G,B and GS and may know
the corresponding secret key partially.
• ǫ1 ≥
1
2 : Bob chooses BS randomly out of leftover erased
indices and knows nothing about the corresponding secret
key.
Just as in Lemma 2, we can show that for a suitably low
δ and sufficiently large n, Bob will have enough erased and
unerased Yi’s with which to run the protocol and achieve any
rate r < C1P .
Lemma 4: Any r < C1P is an achievable 1-private rate.
The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.
IV. PROOF OF CONVERSE
The converses hold even under a weaker sense of security
where conditions (2), (4), (6), and (8) hold only with a 1n
factor on the left-hand-side.
Lemma 5: For the setup of Figure 2,
C2P ≤ ǫ2 ·min{ǫ1, 1− ǫ1}
Proof: We first state a general upperbound on C2P : For
the setup of Figure 1,
C2P ≤ min
{
max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z),max
pX
H(X |Y, Z)
}
. (9)
C2P ≤ maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) follows from the observation that
operating the protocol with Bob setting C = 0 allows Alice
and Bob to agree on the secret key K0 which is secret from
Eve. Since maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) is an upperbound on secret
key capacity of the broadcast channel pY,Z|X (with public
discussion) [2], the bound follows.
It is easy to verify that the 2-private protocol can be viewed
as a (two-party) OT protocol between the parties Alice and
Bob-Eve (combined). Hence, by invoking an outerbound on
OT capacity in [1], we have C2P ≤ maxpX H(X |Y, Z).
Evaluating these upper bounds in (9) for the specific setup
in Figure 2,
C2P ≤ max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z) = ǫ2(1− ǫ1),
C2P ≤ max
pX
H(X |(Y, Z)) = ǫ2ǫ1.
Lemma 6: For the setup of Figure 2,
C1P ≤ min
{
ǫ1,
ǫ2
2
, ǫ2(1 − ǫ1)
}
Proof: We first show that C1P ≤ min {ǫ1, ǫ2(1− ǫ1)} by
means of the following more general statement: For the setup
of Figure 1,
C1P ≤
{
max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z),max
pX
H(X |Y )
}
. (10)
Proof of C1P ≤ maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) is identical to the one
for 2-private case (9). C1P ≤ maxpX H(X |Y ) follows from
observing that a 1-private protocol is also a protocol for OT
between Alice and Bob over the channel pY |X for which
maxpX H(X |Y ) is an upperbound on OT capacity [1]. Eval-
uating (10) for the specific setup in Figure 2,
C1P ≤ max
pX
H(X |Y ) = ǫ1,
C1P ≤ max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z) = ǫ2(1 − ǫ1).
It only remains to show that C1P ≤ ǫ22 . For this, we need the
following lemma which states that (Xn, F k) must together
carry nearly all the information about (K0,K1).
Lemma 7: 1nH(K0,K1|X
n, F k) −→ 0 as n −→∞.
The proof is deferred to the appendix. The lemma can be
interpreted as follows: Bob’s privacy against Alice (eqn. 7)
implies that Alice is unaware of which string is required by
Bob. This forces that both the strings be decodable from ob-
serving the the interface of Alice to the system (i.e. observing
(Xn, F k)). If this were not the case and K0, say, could not be
fully decoded from (Xn, F k), then Alice can infer that Bob
wanted K1 (i.e., C = 1) violating the requirement of (7).
To convert this into an upperbound on the rate, intuitively,
Eve has access to all of (Xn, F k) except those bits of Xn
erased by her channel. Since the erased fraction of bits is
about ǫ2, and we require both strings to be secret from Eve,
each string has a rate of at most ǫ2/2. We make this argument
more formally below. Let I = {i1, . . . , in}, be the instances
where the channel is used and the (random) set of indices at
which Eve saw erasures be E′ := {i ∈ I : Zi = erasure}. Let
e′ denote a realization of E′ and e′ = I\e′ its complement.
2m = H(K0,K1)
= I(K0,K1;X
n, F k) +H(K0,K1|X
n, F k)
(a)
= I(K0,K1;X
n, F k) + o(n)
(b)
= I(K0,K1;X
n, F k|E′) + o(n)
=
∑
e′⊆I
pE′(e
′)I(K0,K1;X
n, F k|E′ = e′) + o(n)
=
∑
e′⊆I
pE′(e
′)I(K0,K1;X
n|e′ , F
k|E′ = e′) + o(n)
+
∑
e′⊆I
pE′(e
′)I(K0,K1;X
n|e′ |X
n|e′ , F
k, E′ = e′)
≤
∑
e′⊆I
pE′(e
′)I(K0,K1;X
n|e′ , F
k|E′ = e′)
+
∑
e′⊆I
pE′(e
′)H(Xn|e′ |E
′ = e′) + o(n)
= I(K0,K1;Z
n, F k) + nǫ2 + o(n)
(c)
= nǫ2 + o(n),
where (a) follows from Lemma 7, (b) from the independence
of Eve’s channel, and (c) from (8). Therefore, C1P ≤ ǫ22 .
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We need two lemmas from [1], which are stated here for
completeness.
Lemma 8: Let U,V,Z denote random variables with values
in finite sets U , V and Z respectively. Suppose z1, z2 ∈ Z
with P [Z = z1] = p > 0 and P [Z = z2] = q > 0. Then,
|H(U |V, Z = z1)−H(U |V, Z = z2)|
≤ 3
√
(p+ q) ln 2
2pq
I(UV ;Z)log|U|+ 1.
Proof: See [1].
Lemma 9: I(K0,K1,M ;C,N, Y n|Xn, F k) = 0.
Proof: See [1] or Lemma 2.2 of [2].
Note that (7) and Lemma 8 together imply
H(K0|X
n, F k, C = 0)−H(K0|X
n, F k, C = 1) = o(n),
H(K1|X
n, F k, C = 0)−H(K1|X
n, F k, C = 1) = o(n).
Multiplying both equations by 12 and subtracting, we get
H(KC |X
n, F k, C)−H(KC |X
n, F k, C) = o(n). (11)
Lemma 9 implies that I(K0,K1;C|Xn, F k) = 0. Hence,
H(K0,K1|X
n, F k)
= H(K0,K1|X
n, F k, C)
= H(KC ,KC |X
n, F k, C)
= H(KC |X
n, F k, C) +H(KC |X
n, F k, C,KC)
≤ H(KC |X
n, F k, C) +H(KC |X
n, F k, C).
In light of (11), this lemma will be proved if we show either
H(KC |Xn, F k, C) or H(KC |X
n, F k, C) to be o(n).
For this we note that Lemma 9 implies
I(K0,K1;N, Y
n|Xn, F k, C) = 0.
This, in turn, implies that
I(KC ,KC ;N, Y
n|Xn, F k, C) = 0.
Hence, I(KC ;N, Y n|Xn, F k, C) = 0. Therefore,
H(KC |X
n, F k, C) = H(KC |X
n, F k, C,N, Y n)
(a)
= H(KC |X
n, F k, C,N, Y n, KˆC)
≤ H(KC |KˆC)
(b)
= o(n),
where (a) follows from the fact that since KˆC is a function of
(C,N, Y n, F k), and (b) from (5) and Fano’s inequality.
APPENDIX B
A USEFUL LEMMA
In the following, for r′ < 1, we consider the construction of
a random (n, nr′) binary code C, generated with i.i.d. Ber( 12 )
components. For any code C, let XC be a random codeword
picked uniformly from the code. For any set J ⊂ [1 : n], let
XC |J denote the components of XC in J . H(XC |J ) is the
entropy of the vector XC |J . This is a function of the code,
and so H(XC |J) is a random variable under the above random
code construction. The following lemma states that for any
r < r′ and β < r′− r, if |J | ≥ nr, then with high probability
over the code, H(XC|J ) ≥ nr − 2−nβ .
Lemma 10: Let r < r′ < 1, and C be a random (n, nr′)
binary code generated with i.i.d. Ber( 12 ) components. Let XC |J
be as defined above. Then for any β, 0 < β < (r′ − r), with
high probability, the code satisfies the following property: for
any set J ⊂ [1 : n] with |J | ≥ nr, H(XC |J) ≥ nr − 2−nβ .
Proof: Wlog, let us assume |J | = nr. Let the N = 2nr′
random codewords be denoted by Xi; i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Let
us denote the codeword components in J by Yi := Xi|J .
By assumption, clearly Yi are independent and uniformly
distributed over the 2nr binary strings in {0, 1}nr. Let us
denote the empirical distribution of Yi; i = 1, 2, · · · , N as
pˆJ . We are interested in the entropy H(pˆJ).
By Sanov’s theorem,
Pr
[
H(pˆJ) < nr − 2
−nβ
]
≤ (N + 1)2
nr
2−ND(p
∗||u)
where u dentoes the uniform distribution over {0, 1}nr, and
p∗ = arg min
p:H(p)<nr−2−nβ
D(p||u).
Clearly,
D(p∗||u) = nr −H(p∗) > 2−nβ.
So
Pr
[
H(pˆJ) < nr − 2
−nβ
]
< (2nr
′
+ 1)2
nr
2−2
nr′ ·2−nβ
< 2n(r
′+1/n)·2nr · 2−2
nr′ ·2−nβ
≤ 2−2
nr(2n(r
′
−r−β)−n(r′+1/n)).
By union bound,
Pr
[
H(pˆJ) < nr − 2
−nβ for some J
]
≤
(
n
nr
)
2−2
nr(2n(r
′
−r−β)−n(r′+1/n))
≤ 2nH(r) · 2−2
nr(2n(r
′
−r−β)−n(r′+1/n)).
Since β < r′ − r, the above upper bound goes to zero as
n −→∞.
